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COMMENTS
FPC MUST CONSIDER ALLEGATIONS OF A RETAIL PRICE
SQUEEZE IN SETTING WHOLESALE RATES
FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976)
In FPC v. Conway Corp.,' the Supreme Court directed the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) to consider the impact of wholesale energy
rates upon the retail energy market.' This decision provides the Com-
mission with the authority to prevent large vertically integrated 3 inter-
state utilities from discriminating against smaller municipally owned
intrastate utilities.
Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L), a vertically inte-
gated utility, sells electricity in the wholesale and retail markets.4
While serving as the only energy supplier for its wholesale customers,
AP&L competed with these utilities for industrial retail sales.; When
AP&L applied to the FPC for a wholesale rate increase,0 Conway
Corporation (Conway), representing nine of AP&L's wholesale cus-
tomers, attempted to intervene. Conway claimed that by the pro-
posed rate increase, AP&L was attempting to "price squeeze" Conway
out of the retail sales market.7 If approved by the FPC, the higher
wholesale rates would force Conway to increase its retail prices so that
it could no longer compete with AP&L for industrial retail sales.8 The
FPC refused to hear Conway's claim because it would require an in-
vestigation of AP&L's retail rates, which was outside the Commission's
statutory jurisdiction. 9  The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
l. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
2. Id. at 273.
3. Vertically integrated utilities perform more than one of the three functions of
power production: generation, transmission, and distribution. See Meeks, Concentra-
tion in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLTJM. L. REV.
64, 67 (1972).
4. 426 U.S. at 273.
5. id.
6. Id. at 274.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 274-75.
9. Id.
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lumbia' ° reversed; the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, and held:
In reviewing a request for an increase in wholesale electricity rates,
the FPC has jurisdiction to consider the anticompetitive effects of the
applicant's intrastate retail rates in order to set a just, reasonable, and
not unduly discriminatory wholesale rate."
The FPC was created by the Federal Water Power Act of 1920
(FWPA). The purpose of this statute was to replace the unhealthy
competition between utilities'" with regulation-either by state com-
missions or the FPC-in the public interest.'" Under the FWPA, the
FPC could regulate only the intrastate and interstate rates of utilities
operating in states that had no regulatory agencies of their own; 01 if a
state commission existed, the utility's rate structure was subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction."0 In 1927, however, the Supreme Court rendered
these jurisdictional provisions inadequate. In Public Utilities Commis-
10. Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affld, 426 U.S. 271
(1976).
11. 426 U.S. at 272-73.
12. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 30, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920) (current version
at 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1970)). See generally M. CoNovER, THE FEDERAL POWER COM-
MISSION (1923).
13. Under the Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 20, 41 Stat. 1073 (1920), the
FPC could only regulate the rates of hydro-electric utilities. Congress subsequently
enacted the Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 213, 49 Stat. 52 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824e(a) (1970)) and the Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, § 5, 52 Stat. 823
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1970)), and thus gave the FPC jurisdiction over all
gas transmission and electric utilities.
14. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir.)
(Congress relied on regulatory agency rather than competition to control prices), afid,
343 U.S. 414, 417 (1951) (major purpose of Act is to protect consumers against ex-
cessive prices); see Meeks, supra note 3; cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126-30 (1876)
(states may protect public interest by regulating property devoted to public use).
15. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 20, 41 Stat. 1073 (1920) provides:
[Wlhen said power or any part thereof shall enter into interstate . . . com-
merce the rates charged . . . shall be reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and just
. . . ; and whenever any of the States directly concerned has not provided a
commission or other authority to enforce the requirements of this section within
such State . . . jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the commission ....
Id. at 1073-74.
United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 305 (1953) states: "So the language
of § 20 required reasonable rates to consumers of electricity moving interstate and then
added the provision that when no state commission was provided to enforce reasonable
rates, or the states interested could not agree, the Federal Power Commission could act."
16. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 20, 41 Stat. 1075-76 (1921); Hearings on
H.R. 3184 Before the House Comm. on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-66, 95-
97 (1918) (statement of 0. C. Merrill), cited in United States v. Public Util. Comm'n,
345 U.S. 295, 305 n.10 (1953).
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sion v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.,17 the Court held that, even if
interstate wholesale rates adversely affected intrastate retail rates, the
commerce clause prohibited states from regulating interstate wholesale
rates.1 s As a result of the Court's decision, neither the state nor the FPC
could regulate the interstate wholesale rates of utilities that operated in
states with regulatory commissions. 9 Prior to creating this gap in the
regulation of utilities, however, the Supreme Court had decided Hous-
ton, East & West Texas Railway v. United States (Shreveport).20 In
Shreveport, the Court held that the ICC had power under the commerce
clause, even in the presence of state regulatory commissions, to set intra-
state freight rates if those rates had a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. By implication, the Court's holding in Shreveport gave the
FPC the power to set intrastate retail rates even in states that operated
regulatory commissions if the rates had a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce."-
The Court's interpretations of the commerce clause in Shreveport
and Attleboro, together with the advent of the holding company,
a new form of public utility ownership,2 prompted Congress in 1935
17. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
18. Id. at 90: "Mhe paramount interest in the interstate business carried on between
the two companies is not local to either State, but is essentially national in character.
*. . [I]f such regulation is required it can only be attained by the exercise of the power
vested in Congress." Compare Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252
U.S. 23 (1920) (state could regulate rates charged by utility that transmitted gas across
state lines for sale in state's retail market), with Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
265 U.S. 298 (1924) (state could not regulate rates charged by utility that transmitted
gas across state lines for sale in state's wholesale market).
19. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972); FPC v. Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 220 (1964); United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345
U.S. 295, 303, 307-08 (1953); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 68
(1943); New England Power Co. v. FPC, 349 F.2d 258, 262 (1st Cir. 1965); Otter
Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134, 137 (1940); 2 A. PRIEST, PRINcIPLES OF PuBLic UTury
RiGULATON 523 (1969).
20. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
21. Id. at 355:
It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the relation between
intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil to be corrected, and this it may
do completely by reason of its control over the interstate carrier in all matters
having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is
necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government of
that commerce.
22. A holding company's major asset consists of controlling interests of stocks in
other companies. See, e.g., Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973);
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944); Duke Power Co. v. FPC, 401
F.2d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Washington University Open Scholarship
320 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
to enact Part ]I of the Federal Power Act.2 3  The Act grants the FPC
exclusive ratemaking authority over "the transmission of electric en-
ergy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale
in interstate commerce;" 4 it specifically reserves the remaining regula-
tory power to the states. 25 The Commission must establish rates for
utilities within its jurisdiction that are just, reasonable, and not unduly
preferential or discriminatory. 6
In Otter Tail Power Co.,27 the FPC relied upon its authority over
discriminatory rates to block a wholesaler's attempted takeover of
a small municipal purchaser of electricity.28 The wholesaler sold en-
ergy at lower prices to its larger municipal customers in an attempt
to force its smaller customers out of business. The Commission held
that a wholesale energy supplier could not discriminate on the basis
of the purchaser's bargaining power.2" Following Otter Tail, utilities
developed long-distance transmission lines which facilitated the growth
23. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1970) (original version at ch. 285, § 30,
41 Stat. 1077 (1920)). The Federal Water Power Act became subchapter I of the Fed-
eral Power Act.
24. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970).
25. Id. See, e.g., FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 454-55 (1972);
FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 210, 217 (1964); Connecticut Light
& Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 518 (1945); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 76 (1943); FPC v. Arizona Edison Co., 194 F.2d 679, 681 (9th Cir.
1952); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134, 139 (1940); Breyer & MacAvoy, The FPC
and the Coordination Problem in the Electric Power Industry, 46 S. CA. L. REv. 661,
697 (1973).
26. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1970) provides:
No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or ad-
vantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disad-
vantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, serv-
ice, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between
classes of service.
See, e.g., Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 33 F.P.C. 343, 347 (1965) (public utility may
make separate classifications for different customers).
27. 2 F.P.C. 134 (1940).
28. Id. at 149.
29. The Commission reasoned:
It occurs to us that one rate in its relation to another rate may be discrimina-
tory, although each rate per se, if considered independently, might fall within
the zone of reasonableness. There is considerable latitude within the zone of
reasonableness insofar as the level of a particular rate is concerned. The rela-
tionship of rates within such a zone, however, may result in an undue advantage
in favor of one rate and be discriminatory insofar as another rate is concerned.
When such a situation exists, the discrimination found to exist must be removed,
For the purpose of removing a discrimination we interpret the statute to mean
that the reasonable wholesale rate for any class of customers be not higher than
[Vol. 1977:317
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of large, vertically integrated interstate utilities ° engaged in selling
energy in the wholesale and retail markets." Although the utility
company in Otter Tail discriminated between interstate wholesale
rates in an attempt to force small purchasers out of business, 2 the
vertically integrated utility is capable of effecting a retail price squeeze
by discriminating between the rates it charges wholesale customers who
also compete at the retail level and the rates it charges its own retail cus-
tomers. By increasing wholesale rates without raising its retail rates,
the vertically integrated utility can squeeze its smaller, frequently muni-
cipally owned, competitors out of the retail market.
In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC,33 the Supreme Court confronted
the problem of unfair competition between utilities and directed the FPC
to consider anticompetitive effects when approving wholesale rates. 4
The Commission, however, interpreted this directive narrowly; it would
not consider the anticompetitive effects of a retail price squeeze35 because
this would require the Commission to examine the retail rate (structure),
a factor outside its jurisdiction. " In Northern California Power Agency
v. FPC,37 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia endorsed
the Commission's jurisdictional limitation for considering anticompetitive
the lowest rate charged by vendor utility to any customer for the same class of
service under the same or substantially similar conditions.
Id.
30. See Meeks, supra note 3, at 68.
31. Weiss, Antitrust and the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETrrON
iN REGULATED MARKETS 165 (1975).
32. Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 134, 135-36 (1940).
33. 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
34. Id. at 758-59 (after finding that the FPC must consider anticompetitive effects
when approving new security issues, the Court stated that similar considerations would
obtain when the FPC approved a rate structure); accord, Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R.
v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 492 (1967) (ICC must consider anticompetitive effects
when deciding whether to approve new security issue).
35. See text following n. 32 supra.
36. Florida Power and Light Co., 50 F.P.C. 1626, 1627 (1973) (FPC has no juris-
diction to fashion relief for price squeeze on basis of retail rates); Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 50 F.P.C. 836, 837 (1973) (relief for price squeeze relates not to wholesale costs
but to retail rates which are under the state's sole jurisdiction). But see Panhandle E.
Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635, 646 (1945) (in determining the wholesale cost
structure of a utility that sold power in both wholesale and retail markets, the FPC
could examine the cost of the retail operation in order to calculate the cost of the
wholesale operation).
37. 514 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (petitioner, wishing to purchase wholesale
energy, claimed contract for construction of power plant was anticompetitive because it
called for capacity sufficient only to supply the needs of petitioner's competitors).
Number 2]
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effects. 8s  The Commission was obligated to investigate charges of dis-
crimination involving non-jurisdictional facts, the court held, only if
the party claiming discrimination established a nexus between the anti-
competitive effect and a remedy within the FPC's jurisdiction. 80
In FPC v. Conway Corp.,40 the Supreme Court again directed the
Commission to consider the anticompetitive effects of a wholesale rate
increase and more clearly defined the FPC's jurisdiction.41 After ac-
knowledgingthe state's power to regulate intrastate retail rates,42 the
Court reminded the Commission of its statutory duty to consider anti-
competitive effects in setting just, reasonable, and not unduly dis-
criminatory wholesale rates. 43 The Act forbids the maintenance of any
"unreasonable difference in rates ...with respect to any sale ...
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission."44 In Conway, the anti-
competitive effect was the unreasonable difference between the whole-
sale and retail rates.45  The Court rejected the FPC's argument that
it could not consider discrimination between wholesale and retail rates
because it had no jurisdiction over retail sales.4" As long as the anti-
competitive effect is traceable to a sale over which the Commission has
jurisdiction (wholesale rates), the Court held, the FPC can reduce the
wholesale price to the lowest just and reasonable rate.17  The Court
concluded that by requiring the Commission to examine the entire
38. The court explained:
The Supreme Court and this court have held, time and again, that the Federal
Power Commission, as other regulatory agencies, must consider the anticom-
petitive consequences of matters properly before it .... Of course, this is not
to say that the doctrine is without limits or that the Commission must hold
"hearings" on every complaint alleging anti-trust violations. 514 F.2d at 187.
The court went on to quote the test from City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 955
(D.C. Cir. 1971): "'Where an agency has some regulatory jurisdiction over operations,
it must consider whether there is a reasonable nexus between the matters subject to Its
surveillance and those under attack on anticompetitive grounds."'" Id. at 187-88 (emphasis
supplied by Lafayette court).
39. Id. at 189 (court upheld FPC's determination that the Commission had no
jurisdiction to remedy the anticompetitive effect by increasing the plant's capacity and
that petitioner had failed to establish a nexus between the anticompetitive effect and a
jurisdictional remedy).
40. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
41. Id. at 273.
42. Id. at 273, 275.
43. Id. at 273.
44. Id. at 273 n.1.
45. Id. at 275.
46. Id. at 277.
47. Id. at-277-78.
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"factual context in which the proposed wholesale rate will function,"
including retail rates in this case, it was merely reaffirming the FPC's
statutory responsibilities.4"
The Supreme Court correctly rejected the FPC's contention that it
could not consider anticompetitive effects in setting just, reasonable,
and not unduly discriminatory rates unless the anticompetitive effect
resulted entirely from sales within the Commission's jurisdiction.49
The Federal Power Act clearly authorizes the FPC to consider charges
of rate discrimination as long as one sale is subject to its jurisdiction."
In addition, the Conway intervenors did not request that the Commis-
sion alter AP&L's retail rates and thereby infringe the state's reg-
ulatory authority." Rather, as required by Northern California Power
Agency v. FPC,2 Conway sought to establish a nexus between the anti-
competitive effect of the increase in wholesale rates and a remedy
wholly within the Commission's jurisdiction: a reduction in AP&L's
wholesale rates. ' The Court's decision in Conway that the FPC must
examine and remedy the anticompetitive effects of an unreasonable dif-
ference between wholesale and retail rates by adjusting the wholesale
rates has forced the Commission to confront and develop a regulatory
policy on the issue of price squeezing.
Experts differ over whether the public ultimately benefits from
anticompetitive activities of vertically integrated utilities.r Although
small, municipally owned companies, are more responsive to consumer
needs," they are presumably less efficient?0 Consumer energy costs
would therefore be reduced, some suggest, if larger utilities forced
these sellers out of the retail market.57  Although there are no easy
answers to these complex economic questions, the Court in Conway
commendably instructed the FPC that it no longer can avoid these
issues by hiding behind its "nonjurisdictional factors" defense.
48. Id. at 280.
49. See notes 45 & 46 supra and accompanying text.
50. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (1970). See text quoted supra note 26.
51. FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1976).
52. 514 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
53. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text; cf. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (discussed at text accompanying notes 20 & 21
supra).
54. See generally Meeks, supra note 3.
55. See Meeks, supra note 3, at 80.
56. Compare Breyer & MacAvoy, supra note 25, at 661, and Meeks, supra note 3,
at 74-75, with Brief Respondents at 28.
57. See, e.g., Meeks, supra note 3.
Number 2]
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Unfortunately, the Court created an alternative means by which the
Commission may continue to evade these difficult policy questions. Un-
der Conway, if a nexus exists between the anticompetitive effect and a
remedy within the Commission's jurisdiction-if the effect is traceable
to the remedy-the FPC must consider and eliminate the anticompeti-
tive effect.5 6 Although the retail price squeeze in Conway meets this
nexus test, the Court failed to imply from the Federal Power ActP7
any standards or formulae for the FPC to employ in determining when
other instances meet the nexus test. The decision whether a nexus exists
between the anticompetitive effects of variances in retail rates caused
by differences in, for example, pollution control facilities or accounting
practices5" and a jurisdictional remedy is, therefore, within the FPC's
discretion. By committing the decision to agency discretion, the Court
has provided the Commission with a new way to avoid further anti-
competitive effect questions: it can make the nexus test extremely diffi-
cult to meet. Because a ruling that is within the FPC's discretion will
be reviewed on appeal only for abuse, it will rarely be overturned.59
If the Court wanted the Commission to confront the problems of anti-
competitive effects and price squeezes, it should have established some
guidelines by which the FPC could determine whether a sufficient nexus
between the effect and remedy exists.6"
56. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
57. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1970) (original version at ch. 285, § 30,
41 Stat. 1077 (1920)).
58. There are only two of many factors which the FPC has the power to con-
sider. Nevertheless, because case precedent indicates the FPC will attempt to limit its
scope of review, it is doubtful that these or additional variables will play an active role
in the FPC's ratemaking determinations. See, e.g., NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (FPC has jurisdiction in ratemaking and licensing procedures to con-
sider effect of employment discrimination on regulatee's operating costs).
59. See, e.g., FPC v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 307 U.S. 156, 160 (1939);
Northern Cal. Power Agency v. FPC, 514 F.2d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
60. Cf. NLRB v. Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union Local 50, 504 F.2d
1209 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (The court held that it could
not determine whether the NLRB's legal conclusions following a § 10(k) hearing were
arbitrary and capricious because the Board had in the past provided no explanation of
how it reached its decision in a given case. After reviewing these prior cases, the court
determined that, in fact, the Board had given considerable attention to two factors. It
remanded the case to the Board for a new decision in view of these factors and directed
it to explain why certain factors were given greater weight than others in its decision.
The court could then raeaningfully review for arbitrary and capricious Action5. Id. It
1221-22),
[Vol. 1977:317
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The Court in Conway confronted the price squeeze problem and
clarified the Federal Power Commission's authority over jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional factors. It directed the Commission to examine
charges of anticompetitive effects in setting just, reasonable, and not
unduly discriminatory wholesale rates whenever one of the sales caus-
ing the anticompetitive effect and the remedy sought are within the
FPC's jurisdiction. Thus the Commission must consider nonjurisdic-
tional retail rates and, by adjusting the jurisdictional wholesale rates,
remedy the anticompetitive effects of an unreasonable difference be-
tween wholesale and retail rates. It cannot employ its nonjurisdictional
factors defense to evade the price squeeze issue any longer. Neverthe-
less, because the Court declined to articulate standards by which the
FPC may determine other cases in which there is a sufficient nexus
between the anticompetitive effects and a remedy within the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction, the Commission can continue to avoid the difficult
issues of discrimination and anticompetitive effects in reviewing whole-
sale rates.
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